Tuesday, September 14, 2010

Why did the Ancients not Develop Machinery?

From Southwestern University, rare now, and recovered from an internet archive.

Energy is the basis of modern civilization; it dominates the headlines, makes and breaks the economy of nations, determines their foreign policy. Yet it is relatively a newcomer to history. It began to occupy men's minds only during the Middle Ages, not before. Egypt, Assyria, Persia, all fashioned their empires without it, Greece achieved her glory and Rome her splendor without it. Very possibly the glory and the splendor would have been still greater, had Greeks and Romans turned their attention to utilizing sources of power other than the muscles of man or beast. For some reason they did not.

They did not, even though they were fully acquainted with a number of easily exploitable forms of energy. As far back as 3000 B.C. the Egyptians had learned to harness the force of the wind to drive their craft up and down the Nile. But neither they nor anyone else ever went further than boats: as we shall see shortly, the earliest windmills date from the seventh century A.D. or even later. By the first century B.C. the Greeks and Romans had learned to use the flow of water to turn mills, but all over the world grain continued to be ground slowly and laboriously by hand or animal. They were even aware of more sophisticated sources of power, such as compressed air, hot air, steam. A Greek engineer named Ctesibius, who lived during the third century B.C. in the city of Alexandria_the center at the time of scholarly and scientific research_produced a hydraulic organ whose power was furnished by a column of water supported on a cushion of air. He designed a clock driven by water: flowing into a bowl at a fixed rate, it steadily raised a float topped by a figure whose hand pointed to lines representing hours engraved on a cylinder; the cylinder itself was made to rotate by the upward movement of the float.

Another Greek engineer named Hero, who also worked at Alexandria though at a later time than Ctesibios, perhaps the first century A.D., describes certain inventions for use in temples which, by exploiting the expansive property of hot air, were able to arouse wonderment and awe among the congregations. One consisted of a pipe and some figures mounted on a disk; when the altar fire was lit, the hot air from it, passing through the pipe, caused the disk to revolve and the figures to appear to dance. In a second device, hot air made the doors of a shrine open and shut. In a third, an altar flanked by two figures holding wine vessels and surmounted by a bronze serpent, the hot air produced a flow of wine from the vessels and a hiss from the serpent. Yet another is the earliest example on record of a steam engine: a hollow ball was mounted between two brackets made fast to the lid of a pot filled with boiling water; one of the brackets was also hollow, and the steam passing through it into the ball was vented in such a way that the ball was made to rotate. Hero even describes a windmill, a miniature version for providing the current of air required to power a small and simple type of organ. He includes any number of gadgets worked by means of levers and weights, among them the first known coin-operated machine: when a five-drachma piece was dropped through a slot in the cover of a sacrificial vessel filled with holy water, it triggered by means of a Rube Goldberg contraption a spurt from a spout on the side. But these and others like them were all that Alexandria's scientific savants turned out; their imaginative exploiting of water, wind, hot air, and steam went into toys and gadgetry, never into machines for replacing men's labor.

The ancients' failure in this regard stands in stark contrast with the accomplishments of their heirs, the men of the Middle Ages. By A.D. 983 there probably was a mill for fulling cloth on the banks of the Serchio in Tuscany. By 1008 there were water-driven grain as well as fulling mills around Milan. The windmill for grinding grain makes its debut in Persia, perhaps in the seventh A.D., certainly a century or two later. In the twelfth century it appears in Yorkshire_ an independent invention, though possibly inspired by news of such machines in the east_and spread over Europe almost explosively, to quote Lynn White, our ranking historian of technology, who has pioneered in bringing attention to the spectacular advances that took place in medieval times.

By the fourteenth century water- and windpower had replaced muscle not only for fulling cloth and grinding grain but for sawing wood, lifting water, operating the bellows of blast furnaces, driving triphammers, turning grindstones, and crushing anything from ore to olives. So wide and effective was the technological surge that, as White puts it, "by 1492. . . Europe had developed an agricultural base, an industrial capacity, a superiority in arms, and a skill in in voyaging the ocean which enabled it to explore, conquer, loot and colonize the rest of the globe during the next four centuries." Mighty Rome, restrained by its technological sloth, had been able to explore, conquer, loot, and colonize no farther than the Mediterranean and the western end of Europe.

Necessity, we say, is the mother of invention. We neglect to add that the necessity must be one that people are aware of. Greeks and Romans did not think it at all necessary to spare men the drudgery and time it took to grind grain into flour, even after the water mill had become known; the people of twelfth-century Yorkshire, it is clear, did. In the lands of medieval Islam the climate was so arid that streams with the flow to drive mills were few; on the other hand since sparseness of vegetation generates air currents, there was. plenty of wind. Here, if anywhere, a "need" existed for the windmill-and the Arabs did not even have to invent it but merely borrow it from Persia where, as mentioned above, it had been in use for centuries. They could not have been less interested. In 1206 by which time windmills were to be seen from Scotland to Syria, the leading Arab engineer of the day observed to his readers that the notion of driving mills by the wind was nonsense.

It was no one from the ancient world but a western European of the Middle Ages, Hugh of St. Victor, who said, "Propter neressitatem inventa est mechanica, necessity is the mother of technology. By his time technology had become integrated into men's thinking habits. They had learned to turn to it automatically as the way of solving certain problems; they had, in short, invented invention. The phrase would never have come to the lips of a Greek or Roman. They totally lacked a tradition of carrying on sustained effort to produce a technological solution to a felt need. Invention, as they saw it, was the result of happy accident. Among their heroes are no James Watts, no Thomas Edisons, no men who devoted a lifetime to studying, experimenting, perfecting a device Their classic story is of Archimedes' discovery of the principle of specific gravity while in his bath pondering how to test the honesty of a goldsmith.

What was it, then, that made people from the tenth century A.D. unaware of a need for labor-saving machinery and made them turn to technology for the solution What was it that prevented the ancients from doing this? Let us take the second question first.

It is said that the Greeks never exploited steam, that they never converted Hero's toy into a useful engine, because they did not have the materials or technology for steamfitting, for fashioning and joining tubing to take the pressures. True enough_but beside the point: they simply did not think in terms of using steam power for utilitarian purposes. It is said that they never exploited the water mill because the Mediterranean does not have the rivers that would provide the flow required. This is not only beside the point but not even true. The rivers were perfectly adequate for driving the mills that were there during the 'Middle Ages. Moreover, the Romans_and the Etruscans long before them_were expert at providing a flow where there was none. What mills the Romans eventually did construct, as often as not were run by water from aqueducts.

These and other similar specific explanations that have been offered do not get us very far. What about the broad generalizations?

There is a school of thought, whose ranks have been swelled by the unswerving adherence of most Marxist historians, which holds that slavery was the culprit: the economy of the ancients was based on slavery and, the argument runs, with slaves to do the work there was no incentive to develop technology. "Their slaves were their machines," asserts Ben Benjamin Farrington, author of a series of widely used handbooks on ancient science and technology, "and so long as they were cheap there was no need to try to supersede them. The supply of slave labor seems to have outlasted the heyday of ancient science." There is no denying that the Greek and Roman economy was based on slave labor, although the most important segment, agriculture, depended upon it only at certain times and in certain places. But one can emphatically deny that slave labor was always plentiful and cheap; there were long periods when it was nothing of the sort. And, if the ancients' technological backwardness is to be attributed to the availability of slaves, how can one explain the date of introduction of what labor-saving devices the Romans did use? It was in the second century B.C. that they replaced their hand-operated mills for grinding grain with the donkey- powered rotary mill-precisely when, thanks to Rome's conquest of the east and the consequent arrival on the block of hordes of prisoners, there was a glut of slaves. And, in the very next century, when there were still plenty of them around, Rome's bakeries began using horse-drawn machines for kneading dough.

Another school of thought holds that it was the abundance of labor in general, whether slave or free, which did the damage. "Labor was too cheap for much thought to be given to machinery," declares W. W. Tarn, one of the foremost historians of ancient Greece "Labour . . . was plentiful and cheap until the end of the third century [A.D.], precisely the period when the donkey-mills or slave-driven mills of Rome were gradually ousted by the water mill," declares R. Forbes in the standard work in English on ancient technology. This explanation no more fits the facts than slavery. The water mill_to which we will come in a few moments_did precious little ousting of man- and animal-power in the third century; a few more mills were built than before, but it is perfectly clear that most grinding was still being done in the time-honored, time-consuming way.

There is an anecdote that the adherents of this school often cite. Rome's Emperor Vespasian, who ruled from A.D. 69 to 79, was once approached, we are told, by an engineer who offered to haul big stone columns to the top of the Capitoline Hill for a very small charge; Vespasian gave him a handsome reward but refused his services on the grounds that he wanted "to be allowed to feed the mob." They assume that the story indicates an excess on the Roman labor market, a mass of unemployed whom the government supported by work projects. But "unemployment" and "work projects" are twentieth-century concepts; antiquity knew nothing of them. Ancient governments did not go about creating work to provide jobs. Certainly the Roman emperors did not, even though they were faced with the chronic problem of maintaining "the mob," that is, the thousands of poor Roman citizens who centuries earlier had drifted to the city and whose descendants had led an idle existence ever since. The emperors took care of them by means of the proverbial "bread and circuses," feeding them through public handouts of grain and keeping them content by enterraining them with free gladiatorial combats and horse racing. In any case, these people were in no way part of the labor force. Besides, manual labor, such as the handling of columns, was normally done by slaves, so the only ones who would have profited from Vespasian's rejection of the engineer's offer were not any theoretical unemployed but the owners of the teams of slaves who held the contracts for the hauling. Commentators on the story imagine that the engineer had in mind some power-driven lifting machinery, but this is pure fantasy. A more likely explanation is that this suggested to Vespasian something no emperor had ever thought of doing before_to entice some of the handout receivers to put in a few days or a few weeks of work for pay. This would no doubt have amounted to much less than the hire of teams of slaves, whose owners had to charge enough to cover the cost of maintaining them all year round, work or no work, and of writing off the loss whenever any died or were in jured. Vespasian, however, said no; he wanted to "be allowed to feed the mob," that is, carry on the traditional policy of giving them handouts, not try any newfangled ideas of putting them to work.

Another argument against those who blame the technological laggardness on a surplus of labor is that what clues we can gather point just the other way. A number of treatises on farming in Italy, written between the second century B.C. and the first A.D., have survived They make allusion to the difficulties farm farmers had because of the scarcity of hands. There were times when Egypt, one of the breadbaskets of the; ancient world, suffered from country-wide shortage of labor. Indeed, it has been argued that a key factor inhibiting the internal growth of the empires that. were established in the wake of Alexander the Great's conquests was the limited agriculture. manpower available: it was never possible to increase the number of peasants beyond a certain figure, and because of this, food production was never able to rise to levels that could support more or larger urban centers. Obviously the solution would have been the development of mechanical aids to relieve the peas ants' back breaking toil and increase his output. The Ptolemies, who ruled Egypt from 300 B.C. through the next few centuries, did their best to wring as much out of the land as they could. They reclaimed large tracts, improved the irrigation system, in introduced new crops. At the same time, being openhanded patrons of the arts and sciences, they supported research of all kinds, including the experiments of Ctesibius and other scientists in the use of water and hot air as a force. Yet it evidently never crossed their minds to suggest to these scientists that they give up playing around with toys and gadgets and get to work on a power-driven mill. Whether the effort would have succeeded is irrelevant; the point is that it was never made.

What is even more mystifying is that labor-saving devices actually came into existence and yet were not exploited. In the first century A.D. a mechanical harvester was developed. We know what it was like not only from descriptions of ancient writers but from a number of carved reliefs that picture it: it was, in effect, an oversize comb mounted on wheels and pushed by a donkey or mule; as it went along it took off the heads of grain, leaving the stalks standing. Admittedly, it could operate efficiently only on level ground and appeal only to farmers willing to forego the straw. So far as we can tell the device was used in a certain section of Gaul, roughly between Reims and Trier, and nowhere else, though there surely were other areas in the ancient world where the machine's advantages outweighed its limitations. Moreover, no effort was made to adapt it for farms whose owners wanted the straw or where the terrain was not appropriately level, an adaptation chat should not have been difficult. Ancient farmers, in short, were content to go on harvesting with sickles, even though this was a painfully slow way to do it and one of their complaints was a lack of hands.

Even more striking than the failure of the mechanical harvester to catch on is that of the water mill. We noted above that the Romans certainly knew the water mill by the first century B.C. A good argument can be made that the Etruscans knew it several centuries earlier. They were superb hydraulic engineers, particularly skilled in cutting long underground sewerlike channels through rock to control the direction and volume of the flow of water. In most cases these channels ran along the bottom of valleys to carry off rainwater and not let it erode the valley floors. At Veii, an Etruscan site some twelve miles north of Rome, the inhabitants cut one such channel, over one-third of a mile long and over eighty feet deep in one place, whose purpose could not have been to prevent erosion. It carried water from a larger stream to a point on a smaller, thereby increasing the velocity of the flow at that point. The only logical explanation for this elaborate piece of hydraulic engineering is that the Etruscans wanted to strengthen the flow at the point in question because they maintained a mill there-and, indeed, a mill has stood in the area from the Middle Ages to very recent times.

In any event, when we come to the first century B.C. we do not have to depend on argument or inference: we know that water mills existed then because Vitruvius describes them in the famous book on architecture and building techniques that he wrote probably in the closing decades of the pre-Christian era. The very way in which he deals with them is significant. In a discussion of the devices in use for raising water, after treating various forms of treadmills, he describes a water-powered wheel that turns an endless chain of buckets; this, he goes on to inform us, differs from the water-powered mill in that the water-driven wheel in the latter case turns a millstone. When he comes to his summing up of the discussion, he does not even bother to mention the water mill. That is all he has to say about the piece of machinery that was destined to revolutionize agriculture and industry. Vitruvius' indifference was typical. A water mill can grind effortlessly in under three minutes what would take a man or beast an hour of hard work Once discovered, it should have swept over the Mediterranean world as quickly as it was to sweep over Europe a millennium later. It did nothing of the sort. During the first three centuries A.D., the heyday of the Roman Empire, it saw scant use. The number of mills increased somewhat after that, but not importantly. In most places the age-old laborious methods of grinding grain still continued.

Michael Rostovtzeff, author of the definitive studies on the social and economic history of the ancient world, was well aware of the shortcomings of slavery or cheap free labor as an explanation of the Greeks' "slow technical progress and . . . restricted range of output." He argues that "the causes of these limitations are chiefly to be found, on the one hand, in local production of manufactured goods and the arrest of the development of large industrial centers, and, on the other, in the low buying capacity and restricted number of customers." This explanation simply puts us in a circle. Industrial centers could not develop because they could not be fed without increasing the production of food, and, as we have just seen, the fixed or even declining number of peasants prevented this. And without such industrial centers, the number of potential customers would inevitably be restricted and buying power low. Men did not break out of the circle until the Middle Ages. Why did they not do it in ancient times?

We cannot call upon mountains of statistics to help us with the answer, for there are no such from the ancient world. All we can do is go through whatever writings have survived, from agricultural treatises to Iyric poetry, in search of anything that will throw light, no matter how feeble, on the problem. There is an anecdote told by Lucian, a satirist and lecturer of the second century A.D., that is a good deal more to the point than the story about Vespasian and the engineer. In an essay that purports to be autobiographical Lucian recounts how he embarked upon his career. He had a dream, he informs us in which two women struggled for possession of him, one mannish and dirty and unkempt and covered with stone dust, the other lovely and poised and well dressed. The first sought to entice him to become a sculptor, to achieve the greatness of Phidias and Praxiteles, the other to turn to education and follow an intellectual career. If you become a sculptor, the lovely woman warned him, "hunched over your work, your eyes and mind on the ground, low as low can be, you will never lift your head to think the thoughts of a true man or a free spirit." Lucian did not hesitate: he joyously embraced the life of the mind.

The prejudice against the artisan that Lucian's words reveal can be traced throughout the fabric of Greek thought. In the Greek pantheon, Apollo, god of music, Ares, god of war, Hermes, messenger of Zeus, are all gloriously handsome; Hephaestus, god of the forge, is ugly and lame and, when he hobbles about Olympus, the sight makes the rest of the divine family break out into "unquenchable laughter," to use Homer's phrase. The Greeks admired and respected the artisan's work; they neither admired nor respected the artisan. Socrates, who ho happened to be a stonemason by trade, was often to be found lounging around the workshops of his fellow craftsmen_but not his blue-blooded pupil Plato, scion of one of Athens' best families. In the utopias he conjures up, Plato relegates craftsmen to the lowest rung of the social ladder. Xenophon, a fellow aristocrat, points our that in those Greek cities that pride themselves on their military reputation, citizens arc not allowed to practice a craft. Aristorle, tutor to Alexander the Great, sniffily remarks that "the finest type of city will not make an artisan a citizen."

One reason for the prejudice was that, from the very beginning, many artisans were slaves; one effect of the prejudice was to ensure that more and more of them would be. Throughout Greek history, the free and slave craftsman shared work, often laboring side by side. Records of the building of Greek temples and other structures have been preserved, and from them we can see that the stone blocks, the column drums, the sculptures, the scaffoldings, and all else, were fashioned by free and slave masons and carpenters working together and being paid exactly the same wage; the only difference was that the free man kept his while the slave turned his over to a master Work of the hands, no matter of what quality, whether the rough hacking of stone in a quarry or the delicate carving of a sculpture, was something that could be done by slaves, and in the eyes of the upper class_the class to which without exception all ancient writers and intellectuals belonged_was not for them. Cicero, categorizing the pursuits that men follow, declares without qualification that "all craftsmen are engaged in a lowly art, for no workshop can have anything about it appropriate to a free man" They were all, as it were, sicklied o'er with the pale cast of slavery

A passage in one of Plurarch's lives makes it crystal clear why Ctesibius, Hero, and the other scientists of antiquity stopped at toys and gadgets and never went on to machines_except in that one field which ail through history has had a special claim on men's faculties, the art of war. In his Life of Marcellus, the famed general who led the Roman forces during much of the Second Punic War, he describes the trouble Marcellus had in besieging the strongly fortified town of Syracuse. Before the invention of cannon, laying siege to any walled city was no easy job but Marcellus was having particularly rough going because the king of Syracuse had entrusted the defense to antiquity's most renowned engineer, Archimedes. Archimedes devised fiendish catapults which hurled monstrous stones upon attacking troops, fiendish cranes with huge claws that fastened upon attacking ships and lifted them right out of the water, even a Brobdingnagian burning glass that could set them on fire from a distance. After describing the formidable array, Plutarch remarks that Archimedes, though he had won universal acclaim for his military inventions "never wanted to leave behind a book on the subject but viewed the work of the engineer and every single art connected with everyday need as ignoble and fit only for an artisan. He devoted his ambition only to those studies in which beauty and subtlety are present uncontaminated by necessity." It was solely the intellectual challenge that led Archimedes to his discovery of the principle of specific gravity; its practical application, though it provided the occasion. for his inspiration, was beneath his notice.

Thus the best brains of antiquity did not occupy themselves with technology except as a pastime or for war. Snobbishness played its part, but there were other causes as well. Science seeks to understand nature, and ancient thinkers welcomed this challenge. But technology seeks to tamper with it, and there was a feeling that this was forbidden territory. Herodotus tells a revealing story about the people of Cnidus. Their city was located on the tip of a peninsula, and once, fearing the attack of a powerful enemy, they began to cut through the neck to put a barrier of water between them and the mainland. As the work proceeded, they noted an inordinate number of injuries from rock splinters, especially about the eyes. It was serious enough for them to consult the Delphic Oracle; the response was that they were to quit work, that "Zeus would have made your peninsula an island had he so willed."

The split between science and technology was by no means limited to antiquity. When the ancient world died, its science lived on among the Arabs. For five hundred years the best scientists wrote in Arabic, yet this did nothing whatsoever to hasten the pace of technological development in Islam. The idea that science can advance technology was not clearly formulated until as late as A.D. 1450 and was not consistently acted upon until our own century.

Another key reason for the ancients' indifference to technology was their attitude toward profit, an attitude totally at variance with what we today un-thinkingly accept as the natural order of things. The ancients were just as fond of money as we are. There were some philosophical sects whose members made a great show of scorning wealth-we all know the story of Diogenes, who preferred living in a barrel to a house-but they were no more representative of society at large than hippies are today. Most men upper-class or lower, were well aware that money was a good thing, that it was not possible to enjoy life without it. Where they differ from us is in their ideas about how it was to be made and what to do with i' after making it. Throughout the whole of antiquity men worked under the conviction that wealth should properly come from the land. All their great fortunes were landed fortunes: if they did not start out that way, they ended that way. Take the case of Trimalchio the hero of the best-preserved scene in Petronius'Satyricon, a brilliant and devastating satire about Rome's nouveaux riches in the first century A.D. Trimalchio, an ex-slave. who became a multimillionaire, got his start by taking a flyer in the import of wine. When his ship came in, he made a killing_and promptly switched to real estate, the buying of farm properties. He acquired so much that though there were vast tracts of his holdings he had never even seen, he would not be content until he could buy up all Sicily, so that he could travel from Naples right to a port of departure for North Africa without once having to leave his own property. Trimalchio would have applauded enthusiastically Cicero's statement that "of all things from which income is derived, none is better than agriculture, none more fruitful, none sweeter, none more fitting for a free man." Cicero exaggerates: there were any number of pursuits more fruitful, but that was of secondary importance compared with agriculture's preeminent respectability, its fittingness for a free man.

Next to owning land came commerce, the sort of venture in which Trimalchio had gotten his start. But it was a good cut below. Hear Cicero on the subject: "Commerce, if it is on a small scale, is to be considered lowly; but if it is on a large scale and extensive, importing much from all over and distributing to many without misrepresentation, it is not to be too much disparaged"_in other words, at its very best, barely respectable.

Lower even than commerce was industry-industry, the form of endeavor in which results depend squarely upon productivity, which has most to gain from technology. Ancient industry, it is happens never progressed beyond the large workshop stage. You will read in the writings of archaeologists' descriptions of centers of ceramic production that sound like operations employing a labor force of thousands, but that is only because' the archaeologist's stock in trade is pots herds and he tends to be overawed by the quantities he finds. The biggest pottery manufactories we know of were all owned by single individuals and never employed many more than fifty men. The very biggest privately owned (as against government-owned) industrial operation we know of was a shield-making establishment that employed something in the neighborhood of one hundred. Back in the eighteenth century David Hume wrote: "I do not remember a passage in any ancient author, where the growth of a city is ascribed to the establishment of a manufacture." Despite a century of archaeological discovery, his words need no qualification. There were no Manchesters or Birminghams in the ancient world, no equivalent of our New England mill towns.

Let us grant that Greeks and Romans did not exploit the potential of industry for making money and that we cannot therefore expect technological advance in that area. What about agriculture? We saw earlier that urban growth was restricted by the farmers' inability to feed more city mouths. Sometimes they could not even feed their own mouths; famines were not at all uncommon in ancient times. In the days of the Roman Empire there was plenty of land, with rich landowners holding the lion's share of it; why did they not seek to make better use of their resources? Pliny, Rome's savant whom we have several times quoted in earlier chapters, actually asserts that, for a landowner, "nothing pays less than cultivating your land to the fullest extent." Why?

The answer lies in another of the fundamental differences in attitude between then and now: the ancients simply did not think in terms of maximum profits; the prevailing mentality of the age was acquisitive, not productive. One strove, like Trimalchio, to acquire as much land as possible, but not to wring it to produce as much profit as possible. Take, for example, old Cato, who lived in the second century B.C. and wrote one of the treatises on farming that have survived. He is the classic example of the shrewd, frugal, hardworking Roman landowner. He has endless advice to give on how to run a farm economically: precise prescriptions for the amount of rations of clothing and food to be issued to the help, how many hours to work them, what jobs to give them on rainy days; he cautions that they must be made to work on holidays, and that old and worn-out animals and slaves must be discarded 'just like wornout tools. But if you had asked his advice on what crops sold the best or netted the most profit, about quickness of turnover, capital investment, and other standard bits of today's economic wisdom, he could not have known what you were talking about. Such matters were totally beyond the ken of the ancient farmer, peasant, or owner of vast estates. One of Cato's hard and fast rules was that a farmer "should be a seller, not a buyer." The same rule is expressed in different language by Columella, another expert on agriculture who wrote in the first century A.D. Some landowners, he tells us, "avoid annual expenses and consider it the best and most certain form of income not to make any investments." In other words, money not spent is money earned. If it costs more to install a watermill than a donkey-mill, then a donkeymill it shall be.

As a matter of fact, profitability of operation was so far from the ancient farmer's mind that he did not even have the bookkeeping that would make it possible. We happen to have some of the records_they were a lucky find in an archaeological excavation_ from a big Egyptian estate of the third century B.C. They reveal that the system of accounting in use was fine for the control of stock and staff but could not possibly yield the information required for efficient exploitation. The owner had not the slightest idea which of his numerous crops was the most profitable, what his cost per crop was, and so on.

We see, therefore, that it was not lack of knowledge which lay behind the poor technological record of the ancients but their lack of interest. The attitude of mind that made the artisan a human being of a lesser order, that glorified landowning as against land use, that left industry at a relatively primitive level, rendered technological advance of scant moment. And so we need not be surprised that the water mill and the windmill, though known, were, in the one case, far from fully exploited, and, in the other, not exploited at all. But what was it that changed matters so dramatically in the tenth century? Why was it that, from then on, men grasped eagerly at all ways to ease their labor, to increase their productivity?

Lewis Mumford thinks that the answer is to be found in that quintessentially medieval institution, the monastery. "The monastery," he writes, "through its very other-worldliness, had a special incentive to develop mechanization. The monks sought . . . to avoid unnecessary labor in order to have more time and energy for meditation and prayer; and possibly their willing immersion in ritual predisposed them to mechanical (repetitious and standardized) solutions. Though they themselves were disciplined to regular work, they readily turned over to machinery those operations that could be performed without benefit of mind. Rewarding work they kept for themselves: manuscript copying, illumination, carving. Unrewarding work they turned over to the machine grinding, pounding, sawing."

It is an intriguing theory, but hard to prove. The earliest mills did arise in monasteries, but that could very well be nothing more than a reflection of the key position enjoyed by monasteries in the life of the times. At any rate, in short order, mills were saving labor everywhere, not merely in the monasteries. The earliest medieval mill we know of dates from 983, as we mentioned earlier; within a century there were at least 5,624 in England alone, serving some 3,000 communities.

Yet Mumford was on the right track in seeking an explanation in that feature which most of all divides the medieval world from the ancient: religion. Unlike the deities of paganism, the Christian god was a creator God, architect of the cosmos, the divine porter who shaped men from clay in his own image. In the Christian conception, all history moves toward a spiritual goal and there is no time to lose; thus work of all sorts is essential, becomes in a way a form of worship. Such ideas created a mental climate highly favorable for the growth of technology.

But this alone cannot explain what happened in medieval Europe. There were, after all, two forms of Christianity: that practiced in the Greek east as well as that of the Latin west, both equally ardent in embracing the fundamentals of Christian teaching; yet technology got no further in the east than it did in ancient Greece and Rome. Progress was limited to the Latin west. Why?

This is a problem that has particularly engaged the attention of Lynn White, whose work on medieval technology we had occasion to mention earlier. He looks for the explanation in a basic difference in spiritual direction between the two churches: the eastern generally held that sin is ignorance and that salvation comes by. illumination, the western that sin is vice and that rebirth comes by disciplining the will to do good works. The Greek saint is normally a contemplative figure, the Latin an activist.

The effect of this theological difference was to restore respectability not only to the artisan but to manual labor, to remove the disrepute under which it had suffered during all of ancient times. And in this, monasticism played a significant role. From the beginning, the monks had been mindful of the Hebrew tradition that work was in accordance with God's commandment: Here, too, there was a division between east and west. The east had not suffered invasion and pillage as had the west; its level of culture had not descended as low, its intellectual and literary life continued much as before, and in this climate the Greek monks tended to concentrate on sacred studies. But in the west, civilization had fallen so devastatingly low that the monks had to assume responsibility for all aspects of culture, profane as well as sacred, the life of the body as well as that of the mind. Out of this grew an interest in practical affairs in general and, in particular, in the physical aspects of worship, a line of interest that led to the embellishment of the church and of the service through technology. Whereas eastern churches forbade music, holding that only the unaccompanied voice can worthily worship God, we find the cathedral at Winchester as early as the tenth century boasting a huge organ of 400 pipes fed by 28 bellows that required 70 men to pump them. By the middle of the twelfth century organs were given a part in the supreme moment of the service, the Mass itself. The east never permitted clocks in or on their churches; in the west, as soon as mechanical clocks were introduced they appear both on towers outside and walls inside.

The writings of western monks express their delight not only at the mechanical devices that embellished their religious life but at those that made their secular activities so much easier, the waterpowered machines that did the milling, fulling, tanning, blacksmithing, and other such tasks. As one of: them puts it: "How many horses' backs would have been broken, how many men's arms wearied, by the labor from which a river, with no labor, graciously frees us?" Technology was hailed as a Christian virtue. In a psalter that was illuminated near Reims about A.D.. 830 an illustration of one of the psalm shows David leading a small body of the righteous against a formidable host of the ungodly. "In each` camp," writes White, "a sword is being sharpened conspicuously. The Evildoers are content to use a old-fashioned whetstone. The Godly, however, are employing the first crank recorded outside China to rotate the first grindstone known anywhere. Obviously the artist is telling us that technological a.' advance is God's will."

The western attitude toward work and toward. technology , as an expression of Christian faith, thus stands in contrast equally to the ancient Greco-Roman attitudes and that of the medieval eastern church. It is dramatically symbolized in a manuscript of the Gospels produced at Winchester shortly after the year 1000. Here, God is portrayed as He would never be in the eastern church, as a master craftsman holding scales, a carpenter's square, and a pair of compasses. He is at the opposite pole from Homer's Zeus, who joined his fellow deities in laughing unquenchably at the gnarled, limping Hephaestus.

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Wednesday, May 21, 2008

America As the New Rome, by Mervyn F. Bendle

Blogger Comment: This superb, erudite, and sophisticated essay undermines the notion of the fall of Rome, only to reinstall a sophisticated moral vision of the role of nihilism and moral relativism in the downfall of civilizations. The fact that whole societies just lose interest in behaving decently is the real source of the shift in loyalties and interests which we, in retrospect, oversimplify as "the Fall of Rome". I highly recommend the journal it comes from, Quadrant, as Australia's leading cultural journal.

America as the New Rome
Mervyn F. Bendle

FOR AT LEAST 240 YEARS Western societies have been fascinated by two inter-related events, one located in the distant past, and the other in the near but ever-receding future: the fall of the Roman empire with its causes and consequences; and apocalyptic expectations about the fate of America and Western civilisation. Three new books, Cullen Murphy’s The New Rome?, Naomi Wolf’s The End of America, and Chalmers Johnson’s Nemesis: The Last Days of the American Republic (all first published in America, but issued in Australia by Scribe), in various ways cater to (and indeed exploit) these perennial concerns. All three authors have publicised their books widely in Australia, through press, radio, television and internet interviews, or appearances at writers’ festivals. While none can be commended, they raise some interesting questions about the historical study of ancient Rome and its contemporary relevance, and also illuminate some important preoccupations of the Western intelligentsia.

In contemplating the end of empire, Murphy and Johnson are joining a long tradition, exemplified by Edward Gibbon, who has described the moment when he first thought to write his monumental History of the Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (1776–1789):

“It was at Rome, on the fifteenth of October, 1764, as I sat musing amidst the ruins of the Capitol while the barefooted friars were singing Vespers in the Temple of Jupiter, that the idea of writing the decline and fall of the city first started to my mind.”

In 1782, the Frenchman Count Volney described a similar reverie before the ruins of another ancient city that led him to write Ruins, or Considerations on the Revolutions of Empires (1791):

“Here once flourished an opulent city; here was the seat of a powerful empire … Ah, how has so much glory been eclipsed! How have been annihilated so many labours! Thus do perish the works of men! Thus vanish empires and nations!”

Meanwhile (c.1778–80), Johann Fuseli captured a similar moment in a drawing of the artist slumped in awe next to the gigantic fragments of the Colossus of Constantine found in the courtyard of the Capitoline Museums in Rome. Then, a century on, Gustave Doré drew a similar picture, envisaging a future imperial London lying in ruins before the awestruck artist. Now, a further 140 years later, Murphy records the same type of experience as he wandered about Washington DC:

“I doubt I’m the only person who has trod, with lofty step, the sculpted gardens of the Capitol and been seized with a vision of how the city below might appear as a ruin. [Great national edifices] invite you to see them as derelicts … What calamity could bring the capital to this condition? Earthquake, Pestilence? Pride?”

Murphy found himself impelled to emulate Gibbon—albeit writing in a prophetic rather than an historical mode—and explore America’s impending decline and fall, if such is to be its fate.

By contrast, Johnson displays little of this prophetic vision or sense of historical depth, but is rather a pugnacious and pragmatic polemicist, merely exploiting the fate of Rome to continue his left-wing assault on the US government and its policies that he launched in Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire in 2002.

Wolf, for her part, has also produced a polemic, indeed an hysterical and paranoid effusion that is concerned with comparing America not to Rome but rather to Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy, in order to identify “parallels” that show how America is devolving into a terrorist superpower. Her book compiles these into a sort of “how-to” manual for constructing a fascist state: invoke an internal and external threat; establish secret prisons; develop a paramilitary force; place ordinary citizens under surveillance; infiltrate citizens’ groups; arbitrarily detain citizens; target key individuals; restrict the press; represent criticism as espionage and dissent as treason; and subvert the rule of law. Rome appears only as the scene of Mussolini’s activities and Wolf’s book is best treated as an example of the strong apocalyptic tendency in American culture. It is also an example of the reckless, adversarial nature of the intelligentsia, to which we will return later.

Underlying Murphy’s book is the conviction that “the debate over Rome’s ultimate fate holds a key to thinking about our own”. In the American title of the book he asks of Americans: Are we Rome? And can Americans learn anything of contemporary relevance from the achievements, failures, weaknesses and fate of Rome? He himself is clearly convinced that Americans (and their allies and enemies) can indeed learn something, and (like Wolf) he identifies a set of “parallels” that allegedly exist between Rome and America, and he explores these in the chapters of his book: (1) A sense of imperial destiny and arrogance that tends to view the world as if it revolves around the imperial capital, be it Rome or Washington; (2) The enormous military power that underpins empire but increasingly comes to rely not on a professional army of citizens but on barbarians (Rome) and mercenaries (America); (3) A blurring of the distinction between public and private wealth and an associated tendency to privatise public assets that Murphy claims is inextricably linked to corruption; (4) An ethnocentrism shared by Rome and America that arises out of their dominance and leads them to disparage and underestimate the people beyond their frontiers; (5) The role of borders, which, Murphy claims, reveals a centuries-long Roman capacity to assimilate newcomers that America apparently cannot emulate; (6) Finally, Murphy identifies “the complexity parallel”, according to which, he claims, “the bigger the entity and the more things it touches, the more susceptible it is to forces beyond its control. Maintaining stability requires far more work than fomenting instability.”

These themes give Murphy’s book its structure, but right away there are problems. To begin with, some of the arguments are trivial, for example, the claim that Rome was ethnocentric and arrogant because it produced maps, arranged road markers, and erected monuments that placed it at the centre, as if it was conceivable that Romans would have sensibly orientated themselves in any other way at the time. And one suspects that these parallels could be drawn with many countries, including China throughout much of its history. Moreover, some of Murphy’s “parallels” seem obviously contrived, as if they have been chosen mainly to ensure the relevance of Murphy’s discussion to current political issues and preoccupations in America in the current presidential election year, rather than to explore authentically and systematically the true points of contact and divergence between Rome and the USA.

Johnson’s approach is similar, although he has a more limited agenda, using the example of ancient Rome to attack what he sees as American imperialism and militarism, which he insists will lead to catastrophe: “The collapse of the Roman Republic offers a perfect case study of how imperialism and militarism can undermine even the best defences of a democracy.”


ATTENTIVE READERS might notice that although Johnson invokes Gibbon and his explanation for the fall of the Roman empire, and also seeks to incorporate into his argument the fate of the British empire, he actually seems to focus on the Roman republic, which is conventionally taken to have ended with the Battle of Actium in 31 BC, whereas the end of the empire is usually given as 476 AD, when the last emperor of the western Roman empire, Romulus Augustus, was deposed and not replaced—half a millennium later.

Such readers might have even more pressing concerns—concerns that strike at the very heart of this type of polemical exploitation of the history of ancient Rome. Clearly, for such polemics to have any cogency two conditions need to be met: first, Rome needs really to have suffered a precipitous decline and fall; and, second, this needs to have happened for the reasons that the polemicists claim, otherwise their strategy of drawing close parallels between ancient Rome and contemporary America loses whatever power it might have.

Therefore, we must ask, what was the fate of Rome? Did Rome really “fall” sometime around the fifth century, as we have come to accept since Gibbon published his volumes of the Decline and Fall? Or did something else happen to it? And if it did fall, what were the causes? And were they primarily internal (for example, decadence or militarism), or external (barbarian invasions)? And do such questions really have anything to teach us across a gulf of 1500 years?

These are clearly substantial matters that illustrate the complex issues with which exercises in comparative history have to deal, and Murphy and Johnson generally avoid discussing them. Therefore, in order that we can more fully assess the type of arguments advanced in these books, we will review what Gibbon himself had to say about the fall of Rome, before more briefly reviewing some subsequent theories, including the great competing analysis proposed by Henri Pirenne in Mohammed and Charlemagne (1937), and the findings of the most recent historians of Rome. Ironically, Murphy and Johnson have chosen to launch their jeremiads at a propitious time for the study of Roman history. As Peter Heather (The Fall of the Roman Empire, 2005) points out: “Two generations of scholarship since the Second World War have revolutionized our understanding both of the Roman Empire and of the wider [barbarian] world … The intellectual impact of these [research] trends has been electric.”

Other historians before Gibbon had explored the idea of civilisational collapse. For example, Edward Wortley Montagu had published Reflections on the Rise and Fall of the Ancient Republics in 1759. Nevertheless, it was Gibbon who gave it brilliant and memorable expression. In Chapter 38 of The Decline and Fall (D.M. Low abridgement), Gibbon offers his “General Observations on the Fall of the Roman Empire in the West”, concluding that:

“The decline of Rome was the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness. Prosperity ripened the principle of decay; the causes of destruction multiplied with the extent of conquest; and as soon as time or accident had removed the artificial supports, the stupendous fabric yielded to the pressure of its own weight.”

These are, of course, memorable words, capturing the essential themes that have ever since been associated with Gibbon’s analysis of the fall of Rome and the fate of empires. They suggest, for example, that “immoderate greatness” leads naturally and inevitably to decline, that there is a “principle of decay” inherent in civilisations, and that such immense human achievements can precipitously collapse under “the pressure of [their] own weight”. These observations have the quality of general predictions about the history of civilisations and certainly helped provoke the subsequent interest in the fall of Rome, treated as a case study of “immoderate greatness”, as, of course, we are seeing once again with these efforts by Murphy and Johnson.

However, before Gibbon reaches this famous assessment of Rome’s fall he offers an equally grand encomium of its achievements, especially in its earlier centuries, invoking the great Greek historian Polybius, who had witnessed Rome’s annihilation of Carthage and whose work revealed “the deep foundations of the greatness of Rome”:

“The fidelity of the citizens to each other and to the state was confirmed by the habits of education and the prejudices of religion. Honour, as well as virtue, was the principle of the republic; the ambitious citizens laboured to deserve the solemn glories of a triumph; and the ardour of the Roman youth was kindled into active emulation as often as they beheld the domestic images of their ancestors. The temperate struggles of the patricians and plebeians had finally established the firm and equal balance of the constitution, which united the freedom of popular assemblies with the authority and wisdom of a senate and the executive powers of a regal magistrate.”

In a passage that would irritate Johnson, with his over-heated hatred of militarism and imperialism, Gibbon describes how Rome mobilised the power of its citizen army and its Italian allies, “who yielded to the valour and embraced the alliance of the Romans”. Rome was driven by “the spirit and success of a people incapable of fear and impatient of repose”, advancing “with rapid steps to the Euphrates, the Danube, the Rhine, and the Ocean; and the images of gold, or silver, or brass, that might serve to represent the nations and their kings, were successively broken by the iron monarchy of Rome”.

However, from the heights of this imperial apogee the story of the ruin of Rome, according to Gibbon, “is simple and obvious”:

“The victorious legions, who, in distant wars, acquired the vices of strangers and mercenaries, first oppressed the freedom of the republic, and afterwards violated the majesty of the purple. The emperors, anxious for their personal safety and the public peace, were reduced to the base expedient of corrupting the discipline which rendered them alike formidable to their sovereign and to the enemy; the vigour of the military government was relaxed and finally dissolved by the partial institutions of Constantine; and the Roman world was overwhelmed by a deluge of barbarians.”

Despite the radical fervour that they bring to their jeremiads, not even Johnson or Wolf could claim that this offers a relevant parallel to anything that is happening in the USA.


GIBBON ACTUALLY acknowledges a range of causes for Rome’s fall, including the role played by Christianity, and because this is often taken as a central element of his explanation for the fall of Rome it is worth careful review. Gibbon observes that when “the happiness of a future life is the great object of religion, we may hear without surprise or scandal that … Christianity had some influence on the decline and fall of the Roman Empire”. The enervating

“doctrines of patience and pusillanimity were preached [while] the active virtues of society were discouraged, [until] the last remains of military spirit were buried in the cloister [where] the sacred indolence of the monks was devoutly embraced by a servile and effeminate age.”

Vast amounts of public and private wealth were “consecrated to the specious demands of charity and devotion [and] lavished on the useless multitudes of both sexes who could only plead the merits of abstinence and chastity”. Inevitably, “the church, and even the state, was distracted by religious factions [and] the attention of the emperors was diverted from camps to synods”. Nevertheless, despite these corrosive affects, Christianity also provided “a principle of union as well as of dissension. The bishops, from eighteen hundred pulpits, inculcated the duty of passive obedience to a lawful and orthodox sovereign.” Consequently, “if the decline of the Roman Empire was hastened by the conversion of Constantine, his victorious religion broke the violence of the fall, and mollified the ferocious temper of the conquerors”.

Christianity thus played a nuanced role. It gave expression to widespread feelings of guilt and unworthiness, of fatalism and despair with the present world, which conspired to produce a desire for salvation, with many escaping the vicissitudes of life in the here-and-now through new contemplative forms of religious life. The great martial ethic and absolute loyalty to Rome were swept aside by a new ethic of intense self-regard, elevated to supernatural heights. On the other hand, the new religion carefully rendered unto Caesar the civic observances that were required.

Having reviewed a range of causes for the fall of Rome, Gibbon turns from the Roman past to his own time, setting a precedent that Murphy, Johnson and many others have followed in suggesting that “this awful revolution may be usefully applied to the instruction of the present age”. For Gibbon, the civilisation of Europe (in which he includes America) enjoyed a high level of cultivation, prosperity, and happiness, and a system of arts, laws and manners that distinguished it from the rest of humanity. On the other hand:

“The savage nations of the globe are the common enemies of civilised society; and we may inquire, with anxious curiosity, whether Europe is still threatened with a repetition of those calamities which formerly oppressed the arms and institutions of Rome.”

In making this assessment Gibbon knew only too well how “cold, poverty, and a life of danger and fatigue fortify the strength and courage of barbarians”, while too many “polite and peaceful nations [neglect] the resources of military art”, and leave themselves unable to resist “the rude valour” of the barbarians. He laments that “the Romans were ignorant of the extent of their dangers and the number of their enemies” that were gathering: “poor, voracious, and turbulent; bold in arms, and impatient to ravish the fruits of industry”. These barbarian hordes were violently “agitated by the rapid impulse of war”, and behind them were the remorseless Huns, propelled westwards by their enemies, while beyond them all were “the distant revolutions of China”.

The French Revolution radicalised the historical study of Rome, with the French initially adopting doctrines and imagery that were inspired by the Roman republic, before shifting focus to the empire when Napoleon rose to power. Meanwhile, Britain and Germany turned to ancient Greece as a model of resistance to tyranny. Consequently, according to David Gress (From Plato to NATO, 1998), “ever since Napoleonic times, French thinkers … looked to Rome and accepted Rome’s contribution to the West, while progressive Germans, Britons, and Americans tended to see Rome as at best a necessary evil and to choose the Greeks as models”.

An interesting variation of this Northern view was proposed in 1800 by the German Romantic Johann Herder. He envisaged Rome as a near lifeless form that had lain on her deathbed for centuries until there came “northern giants, to whom the enervated Romans appeared dwarfs; they ravaged Rome, and infused new life into expiring Italy”. These are Northern European orientations towards Rome that have remained influential to this day, as we will see below.

The works of two later historians illustrate what was lost to Western civilisation with the eclipse of Rome. In his History of Rome (1854–56) Theodor Mommsen expressed the fundamental insight that it was the unparallelled stature and achievements of Rome that gave rise to the idea of the West considered as a civilisation distinct from, and opposed to, the East. Subsequently, in The Legacy of Rome (1920), Ernest Barker showed how the empire realised the Greek ideal of a universal society, a cosmopolis, in which all free men were equal under the law—thus providing the central political principle of Western civilisation. These observations emphasise the cataclysmic long-term cost of Rome’s destruction, the subsequent imposition of feudalism, and the unimpeded spread of Islam across lands that had for centuries lived under the rule of Roman law.


GIBBON’S VERSION of the fate of Rome was attacked at its very roots by Henri Pirenne, who began publishing his views in the 1920s. According to the “Pirenne Thesis” there was no fall, and neither the deposing of the last emperor in 476 nor the barbarian invasions of the fourth and fifth centuries involved the decline of Rome in any precipitant sense. The world of 600, he claimed, was no different in quality from that of 400, and many essential elements associated with civilised life under the Roman empire persisted for well over a century. The key event that signalled the transformation of Rome lay elsewhere:

“The cause of the break with the tradition of antiquity was the rapid and unexpected advance of Islam. The result of this advance was the final separation of East from West, and the end of Mediterranean unity. Countries like Africa and Spain, which had always been parts of the Western community, gravitated henceforth in the orbit of Baghdad. In these countries another religion made its appearance, and an entirely different culture. The Western Mediterranean, having become a Muslim lake, was no longer the thoroughfare of commerce and of thought which it had always been. The West was blockaded and forced to live upon its own resources.”
(Mohammed and Charlemagne, 1939)

The new Islamic empire meant that “for the first time in history the axis of life [in this region of the world] was shifted northwards from the Mediterranean”, and European society regressed into feudalism. A period of anarchy did ensue in the transition period between 650 and 750 but eventually the traditions of antiquity quietly disappeared and the society of the Middle Ages emerged and dominated European history for the next 700 years.

An entirely new perspective on the end of Rome emerged after Pirenne. This postulates a previously unobserved era of “Late Antiquity”, and concerns itself with religious, artistic and cultural concerns. The first great articulation of this view was provided by Peter Brown in The World of Late Antiquity: From Marcus Aurelius to Muhammad (1971), where he argued that “it is only too easy to write about the Late Antique world as if it were merely a melancholy tale of ‘Decline and Fall’ [when] we are increasingly aware of the astounding new beginnings associated with this period”, such as feudal society and the spread of Islam.

Brown shifted the historical focus to the study of contemplatives, monasteries, and holy men and women, and his relatively cheerful approach was a reaction not only to Gibbon but also to Eric Dodds, who had argued in The Greeks and the Irrational (1951) that the later centuries of the empire were an “age of anxiety”, which arose out of the collapse of paganism and the spread of an all-pervasive fatalism, and found expression in the increasing popularity of salvation religions, exemplified by Christianity. Significantly, Dodds drew parallels between this ancient religious revolution and the apocalyptic and millennialist obsessions of the extremist political religions of the twentieth century.

According to the Late Antiquity school, the Roman empire never fell at all, but was gradually transformed into the forerunners of the European state system. This position has been put succinctly by its leading proponents in a major reference work, Late Antiquity (1999):

“The period between around 250 and 800 [was] a distinctive and quite decisive period of history that stands on its own. It is not, as it once was for Edward Gibbon, a subject of obsessive fascination only as the story of the unravelling of a once glorious and “higher” state of civilization. It was not a period of irrevocable Decline and Fall; nor was it merely a violent and hurried prelude to better things … Not only did Late Antiquity last for over half a millennium; much of what was created in that period still runs in our veins.”

Our patrimony, according to this view, was not drawn from the Romans but from a world of Late Antiquity dominated by the Germanic peoples of the North and the Muslims from the East. As Walter Goffart, another leading proponent of this approach, has observed with breathtaking insouciance: “what we call the Fall of the Western Roman Empire was an imaginative experiment that got a little out of hand”.

Inevitably, there has been a reaction to this perspective, and Gibbon’s key insights reappear in some very recent books on the fate of Rome, reflecting research that is far more informed by archaeology than previously. While they retain some of the insights of the Late Antiquity historians they also reassert the powerful notion of the fall of Rome that Gibbon unleashed into the intellectual tradition of the West. In his own comprehensive history of the period, the Oxford historian Peter Heather reviews the various theories and concludes that the western empire most definitely fell but “not because of the weight of its own ‘stupendous fabric’ [as Gibbon concluded], but because its Germanic neighbours had responded to its power in ways that the Romans could never have foreseen”.

The contemporary political dimensions of the historiography of ancient Rome are illuminated by another Oxford historian. Bryan Ward-Perkins in The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilization (2007) points out that the present prominence of the Late Antiquity model reflects dramatic shifts within European politics, particularly in connection with the rehabilitation of Germany in the post-Nazi era: “Already in the 1960s and 1970s the [ancient] Germanic peoples had been rehabilitated from murderous and destructive thugs to become an essential [civilising] element in the making of modern Europe.” Consequently, any diminution of northern Europe and elevation of Rome was resisted, and much was made, for example, of the fact that Mussolini invoked Rome for Fascist propaganda purposes, while a Rome-centred vision of Europe, it was alleged, “might give the Pope ideas above his station”.

Moreover, it was felt that a linking of Western civilisation with Christianity “would be disturbingly ‘American’” and offend the sensitivities of liberal and left-wing European secularists. It would also tend to elevate Rome, Athens and Istanbul over Strasbourg, Frankfurt and Brussels in future accounts of historic Europe—an especially vital consideration as the European Union continues its policy of expansion eastwards while also seeking always to accommodate and placate the demands of its expanding Muslim population and influential Muslim governments and organisations. These increasingly demand that European education and scholarship reflect the “Islamisation of knowledge” that replaces the traditional narrative of the West with one that reflects the teachings of the Qur’an, especially with respect to the respective accounts of religious history and contributions to civilisation.

Consequently, “an interpretation of history that keeps the Roman past, but transforms it into a post-Roman Europe dominated by the Franks, is therefore much more satisfactory”. Given these political considerations it was not surprising that the European Science Foundation’s research project into this period was entitled “The Transformation of the Roman World”: “In this new vision of the end of the ancient world, the Roman Empire is not ‘assassinated’ by Germanic invaders” as earlier French historians claimed, “rather, Romans and Germans together carry forward much that was Roman, into a new Romano-Germanic world”.

Ward-Perkins is not comfortable with this politicisation of the historical study of ancient Rome, and its misrepresentation of the scale of the calamity, concluding his own analysis as follows: “The end of the Roman West witnessed horrors and dislocation of a kind I sincerely hope never to have to live through; and it destroyed a complex civilization, throwing the inhabitants of the West back to a standard of living typical of prehistoric time.” Retrieving some of the spirit of Gibbon, he concludes: “Romans before the fall were as certain as we are today that their world would continue for ever substantially unchanged. They were wrong. We would be wise not to repeat their complacency.”


WHAT IS STRIKING about the conclusions first reached by Gibbon, and echoed in vital respects by Ward-Perkins and other recent historians, is how apposite they are at the present time. On one hand, the external forces that are being mobilised to attack Western civilisation are increasingly revealed to be barbaric, benighted, and regressive in the extreme. On the other hand, the critical internal forces upon which the West should be able to call for support exhibit only opportunism, complacency, resignation and antagonism (and indeed “self-hatred”) towards their own civilisation.

Unfortunately, Johnson and to a lesser extent Murphy must be counted as members of this latter adversarial group, an intelligentsia upon whom the massive scale of the challenge facing the West barely registers. Indeed, their books are essentially quite predictable critiques of American society from a left-liberal perspective superficially cast in the form of a discussion of the fall of Rome, informed by little relevant in-depth scholarship about that event, despite the fact that it is one of the most vibrant areas of contemporary scholarship.

For example, Johnson relies principally on only three secondary texts for his discussion on ancient Rome, which he embeds within a rather impressionistic and predictable discussion of contemporary American politics. Murphy seeks to give an appearance of depth to his own discussion and cites a 1980 survey that identified some 210 theories for the fall of Rome, ranging from too many warm baths (causing impotence) and lead piping (poisoning the population), to more academically respectable possibilities. However, he chooses not to evaluate any of these but simply reduces them to the lowest common denominator, claiming that “looking at the range of explanations provides a montage of Rome’s condition”, apparently believing that the various major theories about the fate of Rome can somehow be readily fitted together or overlaid without major inconsistencies or obscurities. In one paragraph alone he indiscriminately lists some eighteen possible reasons for the fall, including six in one sentence, concluding that “all the prime suspects shared in the deed”. It appears that Murphy is anxious to avoid getting involved in complex and perhaps insoluble historical discussions because what he really wants to do is propose his agenda for the reform of America, all neatly laid out by chapter according to a set of alleged parallels between present-day America and ancient Rome.

Nevertheless, there is a degree of inevitability about the association of Rome with America, with the implication that the known fate of one might inform us about the likely fate of the other. Indeed, so close are the two narratives entwined in American culture that this has become a political factor in itself, a situation that polemicists like Murphy and Johnson know and exploit with their pot-boilers.

This association arises partly from the coincidence that Gibbon began to publish his history in 1776, the year the United States Declaration of Independence was adopted by the Second Continental Congress. The educated elite of the thirteen colonies had embraced an inspiring vision of Roman history, according to which a simple, hardy community had held fast to the virtues of family life, sober conduct and self-discipline, and had consequently built a great society. They enjoyed also a good knowledge of classical authors, and references to Plutarch, Livy, Cicero, Sallust, Tacitus and their works abounded in colonial literature, especially those works that contrasted a corrupt and oppressive present with a noble past characterised by virtue, simplicity, patriotism, integrity, justice and liberty.

For the Founding Fathers the parallel with their own times was compelling. Consequently, the fate of Rome was discussed frequently in the constitutional debates at Philadelphia, strengthening, for example, the case of those who argued for federalism instead of the centralised system that was taken to have fatally weakened Rome. The educated elite were also steeped in a notion of civic virtue derived from Rome and epitomised by George Washington’s “Rules of Civility”, while Washington himself was seen as a contemporary Cincinnatus—a citizen-soldier who led the republic to military victory before downing arms and returning to his simple life on the land, resisting the temptation to usurp the power of the republic.

This history had other vital lessons, and John Adams, for example, in his Defense of the Constitution of Government of the United States of America (1787) examined the governmental systems of twelve ancient democratic republics, three ancient aristocratic republics, and three ancient monarchical republics, finding them inferior to that adopted by the new American republic. Cato the Younger stood as a hero of republican liberty against those who would tyrannise the people, while Cicero suggested the pivotal principle that republics must be based on a system of checks and balances to prevent the abuse of power. Consequently, as Russell Kirk concludes in The Roots of American Order:

“the Roman concept of law and obligation, as variously expressed by Polybius and Livy and Virgil and Cicero and the Stoics, passed into American political thought and jurisprudence, and is permanently embedded in the American Constitution.”

Joseph Addison’s Cato: A Tragedy became one of the most popular plays in eighteenth-century America. Based on the last days of Cato the Younger, it deals with such themes as liberty versus tyranny, republicanism versus monarchism, and the duty of the individual to hold fast to his beliefs even under the threat of death. It was well known to the Founding Fathers, and was even performed for the Continental Army at Valley Forge. It gave rise to such iconic declarations as Nathan Hale’s “I only regret that I have but one life to give for my country”, and Patrick Henry’s “Give me liberty or give me death”. After independence, Washington DC duly acquired its own Capital Hill named after Rome’s Capitoline Hill, while the Jefferson Memorial was a scaled-down version of the Pantheon, Union Station derived much from the Baths of Diocletian, the Washington Monument recalled Trajan’s Column and many other obelisks of ancient Rome, colonnaded federal buildings abounded, and even Goose Creek off the Potomac was renamed after the Tiber.

Conversely, Americans have also always had misgivings about Rome and what it might portend for their own young country as it continued its continental expansion. These fears found expression half a century later in one of the greatest and most popular works of American art, Thomas Cole’s five-part series of paintings, The Course of Empire (1834–36). This attracted huge crowds and gave brilliant visual expression to a popular enthusiasm for pastoral agrarianism as the ideal state of human civilisation, and the corresponding fear that the path of empire would lead inevitably to excessive centralisation, urbanism, corruption and decay. After depicting an Arcadian scene of pastoral tranquillity, Cole, in his third work, The Course of the Empire—The Consummation, depicts a future American imperial metropolis that is indistinguishable from a great Roman city. The next work however, The Course of Empire—Destruction, depicts its fate. In a scene inspired by the Vandals’ sack of Rome in 455, an enemy fleet and hordes of barbarian warriors lay waste to the city and all her people, raping, pillaging, and destroying every aspect of civilisation; even the sky is being consumed by a dark stormy vortex. Finally, in The Course of Empire—Desolation, we see the meagre fruits of imperial ambition, as the once grand buildings are swallowed up by the returning wilderness.

As Cole’s gigantic masterpieces demonstrate, concerns about the implications of empire recur throughout American history. Indeed, to Robert Hughes:

“the anxiety he expressed … is a very American one, and would raise its head at intervals right down to [the present]: the fear that this culture, so new, so full of shine and strength, could be swept away in one catastrophic eye-blink.”

And, crucially, the threat was not external military might but internal moral weakness, with the “seed of apocalypse … planted right in the heart of the American democratic experience”.


NOW, AS THE PRESENT POSITION of America as the world’s sole superpower sits atop the agenda of global politics, the perennial interest in the fate of Rome and its implications for America has once again intensified. Amongst contemporary commentators on the topic, Murphy identifies various positions that can be located between two opposed perspectives: the “triumphalists”, who believe that America is finally assuming its historic imperial role, imposing a Pax Americana on the world just as Rome brought its Pax Romana; and the “declinists”, for whom the USA is an arrogant and oppressive global force, an exponent and victim of “imperial overstretch”, “dangerously overcommitted abroad and rusted out at home, like Rome in its last two centuries”.

These perspectives can be found within America’s religious communities, taking a lead from the respective visions of the two great Christian saints of antiquity. The triumphalist “Ambrosians” see empire as a God-given vehicle for the propagation of the Christian faith, and here Murphy quotes from a Christmas card sent by Vice-President Dick Cheney and his wife in 2003: “And if a sparrow cannot fall to the ground without His notice, is it probable that an empire can rise without His aid?” Alternatively, there are the declinist “August-inians”, who compare contemporary America to the decadence of Rome condemned by St Augustine in The City of God, which called upon Christians to disengage from the irredeemably corrupt secular world and await salvation in the hereafter as the shadow of the Vandals passed over the empire in its death throes.

Caught between the triumphalist and the declinist positions are historians like Niall Ferguson, who argues in Colossus (2004) that the reality of global politics requires superpower leadership, and that this role has presently fallen to America. However, Ferguson laments, at the level of national leadership America is an “empire in denial”, and that this reflects a deep-seated uncertainty and failure of nerve within the American ruling elite, concluding that “the threat to America’s empire does not come from … rival empires to the West or the East. I regret to say that it may come from the vacuum of power—the absence of a will to power—within.”

Murphy also invokes Paul Kennedy who, in The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (1987), argued that America was facing a relative decline in its agricultural, industrial and financial sectors while also suffering from “imperial overstretch”, where America’s global interests and obligations become larger than the nation’s power to defend them. This requires an ever-increasing expenditure on the military, which squeezes out productive investment and leads to a downward spiral of slowing growth, heavier taxes, and a reduced capacity to bear the military costs. Kennedy observes that if this reflects a pattern in history, then one must concede that just as Rome and Babylon fell, so America’s turn will shortly come. Kennedy appears comfortable with this sombre (and facile) conclusion, remarking that futile calls for “renewal” are themselves a confirmation of the decline of America.

In Arrogant Capital (1994), the one-time leading conservative political analyst Kevin Phillips compared Washington DC to nineteenth-century London and fifth-century Rome, as yet another “bloated capital” presiding over an age of imperial decline and characterised by entrenched and arrogant elites, economic polarisation and a shrinking middle class, moral decay and a devotion to luxury, a loss of patriotism, and a general sense of a society in decline. This recalls The Culture of Narcissism (1979) by Christopher Lasch, and his denunciation of a self-centred culture of consumption that has undermined America, producing a bourgeois society that has lost both the will and the capacity to confront the threats that may overwhelm it.

Murphy calls this type of perspective on the fate of empires the “rot-from-within camp” and cites several other contemporary examples, including the radical jeremiad by Jane Jacobs in Dark Age Ahead (2004), which predicts that the failure of each sustaining cultural institution weakens others, so that with each collapse, still further ruin is ensured. Wolf’s book adds another apocalyptic view with her claims that America is turning into a fascist terrorist state.

A conservative analysis that focuses on internal decay is provided by Victor Davis Hanson in an article on Iraq in 2002. Hanson notes the widespread anti-Americanism of the country’s intellectual and cultural elites and observes:

“The anti-Americans often invoke Rome as a warning and as a model, both of our imperialism and of our foreordained collapse. But the threats to Rome’s predominance were more dreadful in 220 BCE than in 400 CE. The difference over six centuries, the dissimilarity that led to the end, was a result not of imperial overstretch on the outside but of something happening within that was not unlike what we ourselves are now witnessing. Earlier Romans knew what it was to be Roman, why it was at least better than the alternative, and why their culture had to be defended. Later in ignorance they forgot what they knew, in pride mocked who they were, and in consequence disappeared.”


WHILE COMMENTATORS like Hanson might be convinced that America is in decline because of the corruption of its intellectual culture, they nevertheless lament the impending eclipse. Not so the intelligentsia, which is the target of Hanson’s attack and is likely to be the biggest consumer of works like those by Murphy, Johnson and Wolf.

Located on the political Left, the intelligentsia positively embraces the decline and fall of America and Western civilisation as an act of deliverance, welcoming it as the well-deserved fate of intrinsically wicked and corrupt societies. In fact, this group is the principal vehicle for the relentless internal attacks on the “stupendous fabric” of liberal democratic civilisation as it has been constructed laboriously and at great human cost in America, Europe, Australia and elsewhere in the West over the past few centuries. For them, in the words of David Gress, the West is

“of all civilizations, uniquely rapacious, racist, sexist, exploitative, environmentally destructive, and hostile to all human dignity. It [is] unredeemable. Only if the West [goes] down to destruction [can] the rest of the human race hope to survive.”

The wilful absurdity of such claims is astounding. As a vast number of careful studies show clearly, on virtually any measure of democratic freedom, economic, scientific, military, technological, communications, infrastructure, educational, life-expectancy, and health care performance, America and other Western societies far outperform the rest of the world. Nevertheless, for much of the past century intellectuals have forcefully projected a view of Western society as “greedily materialistic, spiritually bankrupt, and devoid of humane values. Modern people are always [depicted as] displaced, rootless, psychologically scarred, and isolated” (Arthur Herman, The Idea of Decline in Western History, 1997). Thus, for example, we find the radical Afro-American intellectual Cornel West applauding the “cultural decay [of] a declining empire”, with its “rootless, dangling people” and “powerless citizenry that includes not just the poor but all of us”, as America sinks further into inevitable and welcome decline.

A powerful adversarial intelligentsia seems to be an integral component of modernity in the West. Indeed, “never before the twentieth century had any civilization produced within itself as powerful, as varied, or as wide-ranging a tradition of radical self-criticism as that of the West” (David Gress). This intellectual elite enjoys a privileged status by virtue of its superior education and control over the critical apparatus of culture, a control that gives it leverage over the political system that its ideas would not otherwise achieve, especially if they were exposed to the normal democratic process. As Stephen Koch explains in Double Lives (1996), his study of the Soviet manipulation of Western intellectuals, this adversarial intelligentsia is drawn irresistibly towards radicalism because, it believes, radicalism alone can “tear aside the bourgeois façade [to reach] the deepest truth”, which is a vision of the fundamental wickedness and corruption of America society and Western civilisation. In terms of its cultural nihilism and hatred of everything respected or revered in the Western tradition it recalls the iconoclasts of eighth-century Byzantium and the image breakers of the Reformation.

Consequently, for this group of radical declinists “bad news is actually good news”, and all reports of “economic depression, unemployment, world wars and conflicts, and environmental disasters [are received] with barely concealed glee, since these events all foreshadow the final destruction of modern civilization” (Arthur Herman). Crucially for the ever-increasing influence of this dread-filled perspective of history,

“most people today are barely aware of [the influence of this] almost sadistically redemptive component of the pessimist tradition. Instead, the sowing of despair and self-doubt has become so pervasive that we accept it as a normal intellectual stance.”

Ultimately, it is the radical intelligentsia and the crisis of the cultural sphere that hold the key to the great historical questions about the fate of Rome, America and the West. Consequently, it is the failure of writers like Murphy and Johnson to draw creatively upon the history of Rome to systematically address the existence and role of this vital elite that constitutes their greatest weakness. And this is all the more surprising given that: (1) They are happy to do so in so many other areas; (2) The scholarship exists, because many historical analyses of the fate of Rome focus on the ideological, cultural and religious dimensions of the catastrophe. Any such analyses will be particularly useful where they focus on the origins and nature of civilisational fatigue and failure, such as that which saw the eclipse of Roman civic virtue and its traditional religions, and the emergence and ultimate victory of Christianity in the form we know.

This scholarly concern began with Gibbon but is present in many major historical works, even when they downplay the notion of a precipitant fall, including Pirenne and the Late Antiquity school. Perhaps the reason the intelligentsia does not engage with these issues is that it is afraid to confront within itself the same forces of nihilism that fatally undermined Roman civilisation and opened the way to a millennium of violence, oppression and stagnation.

Ultimately then, does the fate of ancient Rome have any lessons to teach us? Indeed it does, but these are not the facile offerings of Murphy, Johnson and other left-wing polemicists. Nor are they the lessons contained in the jeremiads of those who wish to embrace the desirability or inevitability of decline; such people know not what they wish for. Reviewing the work of the historians described above, it seems undeniable that civilisations and empires are indeed the awe-inspiring achievements that Gibbon and the others recognised. Consequently, they demand a massive and sustained investment of material resources and human faith and energy. They may well be subject to some principle of decay, and decline may indeed be the natural and inevitable effect of immoderate greatness, with the causes of destruction multiplying as diverse peoples and regions are brought within their compass. At times crises may abound.

Nevertheless, in confronting such challenges, we enjoy today the great advantage over the ancient Romans that we have before us their timeless example—the stupendous fabric of their achievement—and also know clearly the terrors and desolation that civilisational collapse entails. For five centuries since the Renaissance revealed the achievements of the ancients, the West drew inspiration and insights from their example and these have guided our civilisation through the greatest period of sustained change in human history. The great dangers faced now by the West are not transitory political issues that find a place in polemics, but a failure of nerve at the deepest level, a loss of respect for the past, and a collapse of our commitment to building the future.

Dr Mervyn F. Bendle is Senior Lecturer in History and Communications at James Cook University. He contributed “Indicting Liberal Democracy for Genocide” in the March issue.

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